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Abstract 
Many studies have emphasized the role of natural resources in the onset and duration of armed 
conflict. Due to its characteristics, narcotics are considered to be one of the most influential 
resources. However, the dynamics of how this particular commodity is linked to conflict is still 
not well understood. Most scholars have focused on the revenue aspects of narcotics and only 
few have mentioned the micro-level aspect, i.e. the effect of drugs intake and alcohol 
consumption on combatant’s behavior during the conflict. With the help of a dataset based on 
224 interviews held with former combatants in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, we 
examined this latter dynamic. Our analyses show, after controlling for armed group-level and 
individual-level variables, that drug intake and alcohol consumption boost the amount of 
perpetrated violent actions by combatants. 
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Introduction 
Natural resources have played a conspicuous role in the history of armed conflicts. Especially 
with the sharp drop in foreign assistance to many governments and non-state armed groups due 
to the end of the Cold War, belligerents have become more dependent upon mobilizing private 
sources of support to sustain their military and political activities.1 This search for finance defined 
a new political economy of war, in which armed conflict increasingly becomes the means to 
individual commercial ends: gaining access to valuable resources.2  
 The relationship between conflict and natural resources was first examined by Collier and 
Hoeffler.3, 4 They found a strong relation between a state’s reliance on the export of natural 
resources, and the likelihood it will suffer from civil war. Subsequently research has determined 
that the strength of this relationship is influenced by the type of natural resources, their illegal 
nature, their level of obstructability, and the nature of the conflict.5 Drugs, which are lootable, 
illegal, and not easily obstructable, are then also considered as one of the ‘deadliest’ natural 
resources available: they have been positively linked to conflict duration in diverse statistical 
studies as well as in more qualitative accounts. However, the way in which drugs interact with 
conflict is not well understood.6 Some authors have emphasized the revenue aspect, while other 
authors have suggested a more micro-level linkage: substance use play an important role in the 
combatant’s behavior on the battlefield. It makes them more aggressive and violent and at the 
same time removes learned constraints against the use of violence, which in turn might increase 
the duration and/or boost the conflict. 
 Although difficult to test, most research has emphasized the revenue aspect of drugs, while 
neglecting this important micro-level interaction between drugs and conflict. This study will, 
therefore, investigate this latter mechanism. It is important to note, however, that we do not deny 
the existence of the revenue mechanism. Notwithstanding, we are of the opinion that the picture 
is more complicated than is portrayed so far in the literature. And gaining a better understanding 
of the entire set of dynamics that appear to be generating and sustaining a range of contemporary 
civil conflicts is necessary for anyone thinking of policy prescriptions that might facilitate a lasting 
peace.7 
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 In testing the linkage between drugs and conflict on a micro-level, we first start by providing 
an overview. In doing so, we show that little attention has been devoted to testing the causal 
mechanisms linking substance use to aggression and violence. Thereafter, we explain how we 
created the unique dataset based on recent interviews held in the eastern provinces of the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) with combatants of different factions. During more 
than 200 intensive interviews, we have asked these recently demobilized fighters questions 
concerning their drug intake and alcohol consumption and their violent behavior during their 
time spend in the armed groups. Using this information, we statistically test this possible micro-
level linkage between substance use and violent behavior. We conclude with a discussion of the 
results and how they should influence future research in this area.  
 
Theory 
In the current discussion on the determinants of civil war onsets, much attention is devoted to 
the relationship between economic incentives and armed conflict. Especially, after the end of the 
Cold War when armed movements could no longer rely on the financial support of the super 
powers, economic motivations have increasingly been blamed for action of belligerent parties on 
civil wars.8, 9 Or as Grossman states, “in such insurrections the insurgents are indistinguishable 
from bandits or pirates”.10 In particular, academic literature has centered on the role of natural 
resources, in overcoming this resource constraint and thereby influencing the nature of the 
conflict. Collier and Hoeffler were among the first who examined this possible relationship.11, 12 
In their pioneering cross-sectional studies they found that states that rely on the export of natural 
resources face a higher risk of civil war than resource-poor states. Subsequently research has 
offered some more detailed insights in the link between primary commodities and conflict. 
Fearon and Laitin, for example, who use a different data set, find that countries that export oil – 
but not other types of primary commodities – are more likely to undergo a civil war.13 Other 
scholars have focused more on the differences between types of primary commodities. Lujala, for 
instance, shows that the lootability (or accessibility) of natural resources increases the feasibility 
of insurgency and lengthens the duration of a civil war.14 At the same time, she shows that these 
lootable resources (such as secondary diamonds and gemstones) have no link to conflict 
initiation. An important contribution in this tradition is also made by Ross.15 He concludes from 
a study of 15 cases that the level to which a commodity is linked to conflict depends on its 
lootability, obstructability, and legality.  
 Taking this research into account, drugs can be considered as one of the most troublesome 
resources.16 Drugs, like opium, marijuana, and coca leaves, are a lootable resource. They have a 
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high monetary value but are compact and easy to appropriate, store, and transport, thereby 
proving to be convenient financial resources for armed groups.17, 18 Unlike timber and oil, drugs 
are not easily obstructable (there is no need for a complicated enterprise to cultivate it); they 
require little control over infrastructure or time to process, which enhances exploitation. 
Additionally, the illegality of drugs also makes them benefit insurgents disproportionally, because 
they are less susceptible to be influenced by international prohibition regimes.19, 20, 21 
Notwithstanding, it is surprising that compared to other commodities, such as oil and gemstones, 
few studies have focused on the linkage between drugs and conflict. This relative lack of research 
might be due to the fact that the dynamics between drugs and conflict are presently not too well 
understood.22 
 Most authors emphasize the revenue aspect of drugs, when linking it with conflict. The trade 
in illegal drugs generates enormous revenues for armed groups that can be used, for example, to 
recruit and pay members, to acquire weapons, to establish command bases, to forge alliances with 
other armed groups and, ultimately, to become more effective and deadly. 23, 24 The study of 
Holmes, Gutierrez de Pineres, and Curtin is an example of this focus.25 They show in their 
examination of the relationship between coca production and Colombian guerilla violence that 
coca eradication, measured in hectares, is positively and significantly correlated with leftist 
guerrilla violence. However, the mere presence of coca cultivation (measured in hectares in 
cultivation even after eradication efforts) is insignificant. Also Piazza confirms that drugs, in the 
form of opium, is an important driver for conflict and violence.26 He concludes that 
Afghanistan’s provinces that feature opium cultivation are at a significantly higher risk of 
experiencing terrorist attacks and of seeing their citizens harmed in terrorist incidents than 
provinces that do not cultivate opium. Illicit drug markets are then also considered to be a crucial 
contributor to terrorism because they finance the existence and survival of the Taliban and Al 
Qaeda.  
 Besides these impressive examples of case studies on the linkage between drug production 
and/or drug cultivation and conflict (in whatever form), more cross-sectional and time-series 
studies also explore this revenue aspect. Fjelde and Nilsson for example, examine the variation in 
interrebel violence and state that this kind of violence should be higher in civil wars where the 
rebel organizations can fund their struggle through the sale of valuable natural resources.27 They 
show in their analyses that drugs production, in contrast to gemstone production, is significantly 
related to this particular form of violence. However, these results remain tentative. Some other 
studies, however, do not show a clear linkage between drug cultivation, its theorized revenue, and 
conflict. For example, Buhaug, Gates and Lujala in their study on the variation of civil conflict 
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duration, show that gemstones and petroleum production in conflict areas prolong conflict 
duration, but that drug is not related to civil conflict duration.28 In some of their models, drugs 
have even the opposite effect of what was expected. Also Wood showed in his quantitative 
analysis on rebel violence that the presence of gemstones or drugs in the conflict zone is 
statistically unrelated to the level of rebel violence against the civilian population.29 
  These mixed results indicate that testing the revenue aspect of drugs and how this aspect 
influences conflict is challenging. Not only, are the number of countries involved in large-scale 
production of opium and coca low (drugs is a rare commodity), but obtaining reliable data on 
drug cultivation and production across time and space presents an additional problem for reliable 
statistical analysis. Additionally, it seems as if these different results are due to the various 
operationalization of the term ‘conflict’: some studies are focused on civil war duration, others on 
civilian killings or on interrebel violence. Furthermore, the production of drugs and conflict 
might reinforce itself. Lind, Moene, and Willumsen for example, state that the conflict in 
Afghanistan creates new illegal poppy cultivation opportunities since the state is not able to 
induce a regime of tight control.30 Consequently, some scholars (although not denying the 
revenue dynamics of drugs per se) have focused more on the individual level when researching 
how drugs relate to conflict and violence. In other words, they are examining whether substance 
use influence violent behavior. As such, they leave the idea of ‘selling drugs’, ‘drugs cultivation’, 
and concepts such as ‘revenue’. Instead, they look at the effect of drugs on combatant’s behavior.  
 There are some preliminary indications that the use of drugs influences behavior in a negative 
sense. First, there is some anecdotal evidence given by the combatants themselves that indicates 
that substance use removes learned constraints against violence and incites aggression and 
violence. A Congolese captain, cited by Baaz and Stern explained: “War is crazy, it destroys the 
minds of people. Some people just go crazy.31 Rape is a result of that too, especially the bad 
rapes. Also, a lot is because of drugs. If you take drugs, drink, or other things – it is not good. 
And many, many…most take drugs.” Also in our interviews, former fighters emphasized the 
linkage between drugs and violence. Participant (2080) explained: “In Mai-Mai Janvier [officially 
called Alliance des Patriotes pour un Congo Libre et Souveraine],, they smoked marijuana. When 
they smoked, they were eager to go fighting. But when they did not smoke, they were lazy”.32 
Also former combatant (2054) told us: “As a soldier I took a lot of drugs. I was drinking beer, 
smoking marijuana and sniffing petrol. Drugs help you to have no fear and just to shoot. In the 
CNDP [Congrés National pour la Défense du Peuple] we raped a lot of women. Soldiers rape, 
because they get out of control from smoking all this marijuana.” 
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In academic research, and especially in the field of political science, drugs usage is often 
linked to discipline problems in the armed groups. Ross for example, argues that drugs as a 
lootable resource, create opportunities for soldiers of all ranks to earn money by extracting or 
transporting the resources themselves, or extorting money from others who do.33 This results in a 
reduced level of discipline and central control within the armed group that controls the resources. 
These problems are not only likely to lengthen conflicts by making it harder for commanding 
officers to impose the terms of a settlement on their own forces, but more importantly, discipline 
problems, have in turn, been positively linked to civilian abuse. Humphreys and Weinstein 
showed, for instance, in their analysis of Sierra Leonean factions that the higher level of 
indiscipline permitted inside the armed factions, the greater the perpetrated abuses outside the 
faction.34 This is also confirmed by Weinstein.35 He argues that a rebel group’s access to easily 
accruable income, for example, from lootable natural resources such as drugs, are central in 
shaping the organizational structure of the movement and its strategies regarding treatment of 
noncombatants: it makes the organization more violent.  
 Furthermore, some other studies in the field of psychology give additional insights in the 
linkage between substance use and violent behavior. However, the connection between substance 
use and violent behavior is complex and is suggestive rather than conclusive.36 Overall, these 
more psychological studies suggest a direct link between substance use and violent behavior. 
Substances decrease the threshold of using violence, i.e. it removes the learned constraints. At the 
same time, particular substances seem to incite violence directly via aggression and rage. 
 Although the reviewed macro-level studies have focused mostly on the impact of drugs such 
as marijuana and cocaine, in the field of psychology, alcohol is most often connected to violence 
and aggression. Although alcohol is legal in many countries, it is the most common and perhaps 
influential drug available. It is, for instance, estimated that close to 4% of all deaths globally are 
attributed to alcohol consumption.37, 38 Research indicates that the most commonly accepted 
mechanism for alcohol-induced aggression is through the disinhibition of fear via anxiolytic 
action.39 For example, alcohol can affect cognitive function in such a way as to decrease the 
capacity to plan actions in response to threatening situations. Alcohol may also increase the 
perception of pain as a cause of greater defensive aggression.40 Additionally, alcohol may also 
serve as a triggering mechanism to instigate aggressive acts for those who already have violent 
propensity and find themselves in “aggressive” situations.41  
 Although alcohol is clearly the drug with the most evidence to support a intoxication–
violence relationship, studies have also found a relationship between physical aggression and 
drugs use, although the results are less robust.42 The association between cocaine use and physical 
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aggression is one of the relations that is well established.43, 44, 45 Less is known, however, about the 
association between violence and marijuana use.46 The use of cannabis is widely perceived by 
recreational users as a harmless drug, a view fostered by some sections of the press and even 
(surprisingly) by a leading medical journal.47 Cannabis in most recreational settings decreases 
aggressive feelings in humans and increase sociability. However, no drug is without unwanted 
effects. For example marijuana use may also remove learned constraints against violence and thus 
may incite aggressive and violent behavior. Furthermore, research has shown that predisposed 
individuals (those that suffer from psychiatric illnesses such as schizophrenia or who have 
preexisting antisocial personality traits), especially if under stress, become aggressive after taking 
cannabis.48 There is also some evidence that chronic use of marijuana can eventually alter the 
nervous system in a way that disrupts social communications; an effect that may increase one’s 
involvement in altercations that escalate to violence.49 Furthermore, its abuse is also connected to 
crimes of violence, although there are relatively few sources of data on patterns of illicit drug use 
and violence.50 For example, Spunt et al. show that marijuana was often used in the 24-hour 
period before homicide.51 All in all, these studies reveal somehow mixed or contradictory findings 
concerning the link between marijuana intoxication and aggressive behavior or violence53 but we 
can conclude that under certain circumstances marijuana consumption seem to lower the 
threshold for aggressive and violent behavior. 
 Notwithstanding, if substance use caused violence only by making individuals behave more 
aggressively, violence would be equally common in all places where drinking and drug 
consumption occurs. Consequently, it is important to note that substance use operates in 
environmental, social, situational, and cultural context that influence the potential for violent 
outcomes.54, 55 Additionally, it is important to note that substance use affects individuals 
differently, based on their physiology, psychology, history, gender, and other personal and 
cultural factors. For example, drug use may interact with an individual’s personality or 
temperament characteristics, such as impulsivity and hyperactivity, to increase the risk of 
offensive commission.56 Researchers have found then also difficult to cut through these 
complexities to specify the particular effects of alcohol and drugs on violence.57 
 Besides the anecdotal evidence, the indirect linkages between drugs and violence as identified 
in the field of political science, and the partly confirmatory studies in the field of psychology, few 
studies have examined the relationship between substance use and violence perpetrated on the 
battlefield. This is surprising because this linkage is often suggested. Some authors, for instance, 
consider hallucinatory drug intake a critical factor that has contributed to the desensitization of 
soldiers during their prolonged exposure to violent aggression and that has prepared them for 
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combat.49 Maclure and Denov, focusing on child soldiers, state for example, that the abundant 
use of alcohol and hallucinatory drugs unquestionably contributed to the desensitization of 
children and their transition from disoriented and highly impressionable youngsters into effective 
combatants.50 However, this linkage has never been empirically tested. In the following section, 
we attempt to fill this scientific niche.  
 
Research Design 
Testing the micro-level linkage between substance use and combat action requires disaggregated 
quantitative data. This study employs, therefore, information retrieved from systematic interviews 
with former combatants that were active in the DRC. The history of this country has been one of 
civil war and violence. After independence in 1960, unrest and rebellion plagued the country, 
until 1965, when Mobutu seized control of the country and declared himself president. Under his 
rule, the country, then called Zaire, became a dictatorship that came to an end when Kabila, 
backed by Rwanda and Uganda, captured the capital and removed Mobutu from office in 1996. 
Nonetheless, Congo’s troubles continued. A rift between Kabila and his former allies sparked a 
new rebellion. Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe took Kabila’s side against Rwanda and Uganda’s 
influence in the DRC, turning the country into a vast battleground for many years. In 2003, an 
official peace agreement was signed. Notwithstanding, the eastern provinces of the DRC are still 
the site of one of the world’s worst on-going humanitarian crises and many warring factions are 
still straying through large areas of the country, raiding villages and committing severe human 
right abuses.51  
 The data used to explore the micro-level linkage was collected between March and May 2011 
in Goma, the capital of the North Kivu province in the eastern part of Congo. During this 
period, 224 former combatants were interviewed (2 women and 222 men) with the help of locally 
trained translators.52 Since 25% of all the interviewed former fighters were originally from 
Rwanda, these translators had to be able to speak Kinyarwanda besides Kiswahili. The former 
combatants were on average 24 years old at the time of the interview (with a minimum of 13 and 
a maximum of 50), and had 5 years of formal education (with a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 
14 years). In total, 72% of the semi-structured interviews took place at the demobilization camp 
of the United Nations, 27% were conducted at a vocational training center for war-affected 
youth, and only 1% of the interviews took place at the military detention facility. The 
demobilization camp is a transition camp for all combatants who leave any armed groups in the 
province of North Kivu. Participants, however, stayed only between 20 and 72 hours in the 
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demobilization camp before being sent to other places. In 8 cases, this led to the preliminary 
termination of the interview. Consequently, they were removed from the analysis. 
 Participants belonged to a variety of armed groups and forces. Most of them belonged to the 
different Maï-Maï groups (74%), followed by the Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du 
Rwanda (FDLR) (38%), the Congrés National pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP) (9%), the 
National Army Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC) (5%), the 
Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD) (3%), and some other smaller armed 
groups such as the Rwandan Armed Forces from before 1994. 
 The Ethical Review Board of the University of Konstanz approved the study and the United 
Nations and the respective Congolese nongovernmental non-profit organization allowed us to 
interview all participants enrolled in their program. All participants gave their informed consent 
orally after explaining to them that they could refuse to answer questions, stop the interview at 
any time, and that there were no negative consequences for them when they did so. Additionally, 
we guaranteed that we would use the given information only for scientific purposes and that we 
would never reveal their identity. In addition to the oral consent of the participants, we asked the 
respective institutions for permission to interview underage former child soldiers, as their 
caregivers were not available. Participants received financial compensation of about 2 U.S. 
dollars.  
 
Operationalization 
 
Dependent variable: Perpetrated Violence 
Capturing the amount of perpetrated violence by a former combatant during his or her time in 
the armed group is challenging. Often, former combatants cannot remember the exact number of 
combat actions they were involved in since their memory is distorted due to trauma related 
sufferings, e.g. posttraumatic stress disorder.53, 54 Consequently, asking about frequency results in 
an unreliable measure. However, previous research indicated that former combatants remember 
the different types of violence they perpetrate.55 We, therefore, captured perpetrated violence 
with the help of seven questions concerning self-committed violence types: (1) Have you ever 
severely injured or mutilated someone?; (2) Have you killed someone?; (3) Have you ever 
attacked a village or settlement?; (4) Have you ever physically assaulted someone (e.g. beat, hit or 
slapped)?; (5) Have you ever physically assaulted someone with a weapon?; (6) Have you ever 
sexually assaulted someone (e.g. touched the private parts, vaginal or anal rape or introduced 
object in any part of the body)?; and (7) Have you ever participated in a massacre (i.e. killing a 
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group of civilians)? Each offense type was coded as committed (coded as 1) or not committed 
(coded as 0). With these answers, a simple additive index was built capturing the total sum scores 
per former combatant, running from 0 (indicating that the former combatant did not participate 
in many violent events) to 7 (indicating that the former combatant was active in all types of 
violent events). The Cronbach’s alpha coefficient, measuring the internal consistency or reliability 
of this measure, is 0.76, meaning that the different questions are significantly related to each 
other and were suitable for building this index.56 The interviewed former combatants perpetrated 
on average 4 of these violent actions, with some (15 former combatants) perpetrating none and 
others (13 former combatants) a maximum of 7. Table 1 shows more descriptive statistics of this 
measure. 
 
Independent and control variables 
Narcotic usage 
To measure the narcotic usage of the former combatants, we asked them several questions. First, 
we asked them whether they have taken drugs in the last four weeks (coded 0 if no and 1 if yes). 
We purposefully gave them this time frame, to enhance their memory. On this question, 17% of 
the former combatants indicated to have consumed drugs (drug use). Marijuana and a 
hallucinogenic drug plant called “36 oiseaux” (translated: 36 birds) were mostly used. These drugs 
have been available in all armed groups and were used throughout the day. Most former 
combatants indicated to especially have taken drugs before going to combat (34%) and only a few 
(4%) stated to have taken drugs right after fighting. This shows that only a few former 
combatants in our sample consider drugs as a self-medication against trauma-related disorders 
due to combat experience.  
 Measuring the quantity of the drug intake is problematic, due to the different formats and 
different ways of using it. We, instead, measured whether the drugs caused any problems by 
asking the former combatants, if their drug consumption caused any problems with their family, 
at work, and/or with the law (drug functioning). The question was coded 0 if the combatant 
indicated not to have encountered any problems and 1 if he or she did. On average, 82% of the 
former combatants indicated to have suffered from some problems in functioning due to the 
intake of drugs. Table 1 shows more descriptive statistics of these two drugs measures.  
 Besides our focus on drug intake, we asked some additional questions concerning the 
consumption of alcohol. We asked the former combatants, whether they have used alcohol 
(alcohol use) in the last four weeks (coded 0 if no, coded 1 if yes). From the 223 former 
combatants, who answered this question, 53% indicated that they drank alcohol in the previous 
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four weeks. Most of them drank beer or banana beer (35%) or hard liquor including liquor that 
they brew at home (17%). We also asked to what extent the consumption of alcohol caused any 
(occupational, family, and health) problems for the respondent (alcohol functioning; coded 0 if no 
and 1 if yes). Less than 20% indicated to have suffered from these kinds of problems due to 
alcohol consumption. Table 1 shows more descriptive statistics of these measures.  
 
Voluntary or abducted 
A possible intervening variable that might influence the level of perpetrated violence is whether 
the former combatant joined on a voluntarily basis or was abducted into the armed group. 
Although the decision to join is in some cases the result of limited and equally harsh choices in a 
resource poor region of instability, voluntary combatants might feel more in control of their lives 
and might perceive the armed group as less threatening than forcibly recruited combatants 
would.57, 58 It is then also highly likely that those former combatants that were abducted are less 
willing to cross personal boundaries by perpetrating violence. To control for this, we included a 
measure capturing this (coded 0 if abducted, and 1 if the combatant joined voluntarily). This 
measure shows that 51% of the former combatants have been abducted into their first armed 
group. Table 1 shows more descriptive statistics of this measure. 
 
Age joined 
Previous research has also indicated that the amount of perpetrated violence depends on the age 
of the former combatant at the time of joining.59 Some authors, for example, suggest that 
children may be more willing to fight for honor or duty, for revenge or for protection from 
violence.60, 61 Also Schauer and Elbert state that children are easier to retain in the group because 
they are more malleable and adaptable, and hence easier to indoctrinate.62 They stick more to 
authorities without questioning them. Additionally, moral and personality development is not yet 
completed in children, reducing their inhibition against performing crimes against humanity. To 
control for this possible effect, we included a variable measuring the age of the former combatant 
at the time of joining (voluntarily or were abducted into). On average the former combatants 
were 17 years old when they joined. Some were born in the group (coded as being 0 years old 
when joining) and others were recruited much later in their life. See Table 1 for the descriptive 
statistics.  
 
Duration in armed group 
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The duration a combatant spends in the armed group, might have a profound impact on the 
amount of violence that he or she perpetrates. Especially the initial period of staying within the 
armed group is often characterized by extensive forms of violence. New combatants are almost 
always subjected to harsh life-threatening initiation procedures, such as severe beatings, forced 
killings, magic-spiritual rituals (e.g. tattooing, scarring, spraying with blood or ‘holy’ water), and 
forced drug intake, in order to make them ‘proper soldiers’ and fear the repercussions of escape.63 
To control for this possible effect, we included a variable measuring the total duration in an 
armed group in years. On average a combatant stayed more than 6.5 years, with one former 
combatant staying 28 years and another for not more than 2 weeks (0.04 years). See again Table 1 
for more descriptive statistics.  
 
Number of groups 
The amount of perpetrated violent actions might also depend on the number of armed groups 
the former combatant was active in. We, therefore, asked the former combatants to tell us in how 
many armed groups they served. On average a former combatant was a member of 1.5 armed 
groups, with a maximum of 5 armed groups. Table 1 shows more descriptive statistics of this 
measure.  
 
Rank 
Another possible influential variable is the rank of the combatants. Some initial research showed 
that combatants with a higher position have perpetrated more violence compared to those 
without a rank.64 To account for this possible effect, we included in the analyses a variable 
measuring the highest received military rank of the combatant. Only 18 combatants indicated not 
to have received any ranks at all. On average, combatants received the rank of sergeant. Three 
former combatants received the rank of colonel, which is also the highest rank in our sample. See 
Table 1 for more descriptive statistics. 
 
FDLR 
The last control variable we included in the analyses is one capturing the number of times a 
former combatant was a member of the FDLR. This group is particular known for their 
extremely cruel behavior on the battlefield. Romkema, for instance, states that “the FDLR is 
undoubtedly among the worst human rights violators in the North and South Kivu provinces” 
and that “the FDLR has beyond any doubt the largest and most negative impact on local 
communities”.65 Since we do not possess any information on how long a former combatant was a 
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member of a particular armed group, we attempt to control for this effect by counting the 
number of times a former combatant was a member of the FDLR. The variable ranged from 0 to 
2, and has an average of .5. See Table 1 for more statistics.  
 
------------------ 
Table 1 about here 
----------------------- 
 
Results 
Before presenting the multivariate analyses, we show some descriptive statistics that gives more 
insight in the influences of drug intake on the combatants’ emotional state. To capture the effect 
of substance use on the emotional state, we described to the former combatants some possible 
effects of drugs intake. For instance, we asked whether they felt powerful or mighty after they 
took the drugs or whether they the drugs  took away pain and fear. The former combatants could 
agree or disagree with these statements. Figure 1 presents these results. 
 
--------------------- 
Figure 1 about here 
--------------------- 
 
Figure 1 shows the percentage of combatants acknowledging that taking drugs has a particular 
effect. Although, these descriptive statistics only focus on drugs intake and not on alcohol, they 
give a first insight in a possible relationship between the usage of drugs and violent behavior. The 
figure shows that most combatants felt no fear, more powerful and more aggressive after drugs 
consumption. In contrast, only few former fighters indicated that the intake of drug made them 
calm, made them hallucinate and made them feel no pain. This coincides with the results of the 
previous mentioned research that links drugs to aggressive behavior. 
 We performed several multivariate linear regression analyses to statistical confirm these 
descriptive results. None of the calculated models suffered from multicollinearity. Additionally, 
we calculated the models with all theoretically possible interaction variables. However, none of 
these interaction variables were statistically significant. Besides these models, we have additionally 
calculated every model with an ordered logit regression. However, no significant different results 
between these two methods could be detected. Table 2 shows the regression analyses with the 
usage of alcohol as the dependent variable.  
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----------------------- 
Table 2 about here 
-------------------------- 
 
The first model in Table 2 shows the relationship between alcohol consumption and the 
perpetrated violence by the former combatants. This model only takes into account whether they 
have used alcohol in the last four weeks or not. Whether this consumption caused any problems 
in functioning is tested in the second model of the table. As the first model shows, there is a 
highly statistically significant relationship between their alcohol consumption and their level of 
perpetrated violence (coefficient of 0.653). 
 Most of the control variables are also highly statistically significant. The negative coefficient 
of -0.103 indicates that the younger the combatant, the more likely they have perpetrated a larger 
amount of different violent types. This result is also confirmed by other research, indicating that 
young combatants are more inclined to be aggressive and violent on the battlefield.66, 67 The effect 
of the duration variable is also statistically significant. The negative coefficient of -0.050 indicates 
that the shorter a combatant stayed with the armed group, the more different forms of violence 
he or she has perpetrated. This negative relation disconfirms our initial idea. However, although 
statistically significant due to the large sample size, the effect size is rather small. Therefore, we 
are reluctant to draw any strong conclusions about the influence of this variable on the level of 
perpetrated violence.  
 Military rank and recruitment also have an important effect; the higher their military rank, the 
more likely a former combatant has perpetrated different violence types. Furthermore, those 
fighters that joined voluntarily are more likely to perpetrate more different forms of violence than 
those that were abducted. This latter result is confirmed by a study conducted by Hecker et al.68 
In their study on the impact of perpetrated violence on the mental health of the combatant, they 
found that those combatants that joined voluntarily reported more perpetrated violence types 
than forcibly recruited combatants.  
 The second model is looking at whether those combatants who indicated that they have 
problems functioning due to their alcohol usage perpetrate more violence. The positive and 
statistically significant coefficient of 0.735 indeed confirms this idea. Those former combatants 
that endured more problems due to their alcohol usage perpetrate more violence than those who 
did not suffer from these problems. The direction and strength of all other control variables 
remain robust in this particular model. Like in the previous model, however, the number of 
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armed groups from which the former combatants where a member of, has no significant 
influence on the level of perpetrated violence.  
 The third and fourth models are the same as the previous two models. However, we included 
one extra variable, controlling for the membership of the FDLR. Due to this variable, the 
adjusted R-square increased in both models. In both models, membership of the FDLR has a 
positive influence on the level of perpetrated violence, i.e. those former combatants that were a 
member of this particular armed group perpetrate more different forms of violence than those 
who are not a member of this particular group. These results validate our survey data by 
confirming the destructive role of the FDLR in the Congolese conflict.  
 In the last model, i.e. the full model, all main variables are included that are statistically 
significant in the previous models. Since the two alcohol variables, measuring alcohol usage and 
possible problems in functioning due to this usage, are correlated with each other, we decided to 
focus on the one measuring the functioning of the former combatants, since its effect is 
somewhat  stronger. As can be seen from Table 2, no significant changes could be detected and 
the effect of the variables remains robust. In addition, the adjusted R-square, measuring the 
explained variance, is consistent with all the other models. 
 Table 3 shows the results of the multivariate regression analyses focused on drug 
consumption. It is important to note that it is highly likely that the presented effects are 
underestimated. Not only was the intake of drugs strictly forbidden in the different 
demobilization camps, but also because certain drugs are not recognized. This is especially the 
case for members of the different Maï-Maï factions. These factions are known for their rituals 
and adherence to magical-religious practices that protect combatants during battle and help them 
fight.69 One of these practices is the intake of a mixture of local hallucinating plants by cutting 
themselves and placing the mixture of plants directly in the blood stream before going to combat. 
However, this is considered to be a ‘traditional medicine’ rather than a drug.  
 Additionally, in certain armed groups, such as in the FDLR, the consumption of drugs by 
their members is strictly forbidden. However, our data show that although forbidden, from the 
98 former FDLR combatants (those combatants that were a member of the FDLR before they 
got demobilized) in our sample, 18 said to have taken drugs in the last four weeks. This is not 
surprising, considering the fact that the FDLR is heavily involved in the production and 
distribution of drug (at least in the territory of Uvira).70 This is confirmed by one of the 
interviewed former combatants (participant 2087), who told us: “They [the FDLR] took people’s 
fields by force and turned them into marijuana fields. Now they sell it and earn a lot of money.” 
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Also another participant (2069) confirms: “The FDLR grows marihuana in places like Masisi or 
Kimua. It is their business.” 
 The first model in Table 3, confirms the idea of what some of the former combatants (for 
instance former combatant 2092) told us already: “When soldiers smoke marijuana, they cause 
trouble. They start to fight and you have to watch them so that they do not run away and rape.” 
The highly significant coefficient of 0.796 indeed shows that those former combatants that 
admitted to having taken drugs in the previous four weeks were more likely to perpetrate more 
types of violent actions. Drugs in this sense seem to remove the learned constrains against 
violence. Additionally, all the other control variables have the same direction as for alcohol use: 
those former combatants that joined when they were younger perpetrate more violence, those 
that joined voluntarily are more violent than those that were abducted, and those having a higher 
rank have perpetrated more types of violent actions than those that have a lower rank. And again, 
the number of armed groups of the former combatants does not play any statistically significant 
role.  
 
----------------------------- 
Table 3 about here 
------------------------------ 
 
The result presented in the second model is more surprising. Those former combatants indicated 
that they suffered from problems due to their drug intake are less likely to have perpetrated types 
of violent acts than former combatants that did not indicate to suffering from problems due to 
consumption of drug. Although this variable is not significant related to the perpetrated violent 
actions, it is worth noting that this negative effect is probably due not only to the small number 
of observations, but also to the fact that those who indicated to have suffered from problems 
related to drug use are probably heavy drug users and abusers. It is, therefore, highly likely that 
their drug consumption interferes with their normal daily functioning, i.e. they could not fulfill 
their duties as soldiers within the armed groups. Consequently, there are likely to be less involved 
in combat and have stayed more often in military detention. We see a first indication of this 
mechanism when comparing the average perpetrated amount of violence types between those 
that have indicated to suffer from problem due to drugs intake (average of 4.25) to those that did 
not seem to encounter any problems (average of 4.88). However, due to a limited amount of 
observations and a skewed distribution across these two groups of former combatants, it is not 
possible to test whether this difference is statistically significant. Future research should then also 
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investigate this more in depth. Also many of the control variables, previously statistically 
significant and robust, turned out to have no effect on the level of perpetrated violent actions. 
The only variable that remains robust is the age of the former combatants when they joined or 
were abducted into the armed group for the first time. It is not surprising that the adjusted R-
square is low.  
 Again, we added the control variable measuring the membership rate of the FDLR in the 
third and fourth model. The adjusted R-square increased significantly in these models and the 
positive and statistically significant coefficient of 0.383 and 0.986 indicate that those former 
combatants that were a member of the FDLR perpetrate more violent types than those that were 
not a member of the FDLR. Adding this particular control variable increased not only the 
adjusted R-square but also strengthen the effect of military rank and recruitment method (joining 
voluntarily or getting abducted into the armed group) on the different perpetrated types of 
violent actions.  
 In the last model of Table 3, we included all the major statically significant variables. The 
conclusion remains robust in comparison to the first and third model: those former combatants 
that admitted to have used drugs in the last four weeks have likely perpetrated more violent 
actions.  
 Although the literature on substance use has treated alcohol and drugs often as separated 
substances that are differently linked to violence and aggressive behavior, we show in Figure 2 
the full model with the 95% confidence interval level. In this model we combine drug use and 
alcohol use together with all the robust control variables.  We have focused on these two 
particular variables, since drug functioning is insignificant and since this combination results in 
the most observations. The figure shows that all of the pictured variables are at least significant at 
the 5% confidence interval: none of the variables crosses the null line. Both drugs intake as well 
as alcohol consumption is positively related to the amount of perpetrated violence. However, the 
influence of drugs on the perpetrated types of violence is somewhat higher. 
 
------------------------------ 
Figure 2 about here 
----------------------------- 
 
All the control variables are statistically significant: younger combatants are more violent, those 
with a higher rank perpetrate more violence, and lastly, those that joined on a voluntarily basis are 
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more violent. Again, this model shows that the influence of both drug intake and alcohol use 
remains robust across models.  
 
Conclusion 
Most scholars examining the link between drugs and conflict have focused on the revenue 
dynamic linking these two concepts. Selling drugs give armed groups the means to prolong the 
conflict by allowing them to buy, for example, weapons and to attract recruits. However, few 
scholars have focused on another possible ongoing dynamic, i.e. how drugs intake is related to 
the combatant’s behavior on the battlefield. With a unique dataset based on 224 interviews held 
with former combatants in the DRC, we tested this possible linkage. Our analyses show that 
alcohol and drugs consumption are highly related to the different types of violent actions the 
combatants perpetrated in the armed groups. These results remain robust after controlling for 
other possible individual and group explanations.  
 There are, however, some important limitations to this study. Although, we interviewed many 
combatants from different armed groups and forces, they were selected on a non-random basis. 
It is, therefore, highly likely that those combatants that are very aggressive and violent or have 
preexisting violent tendencies are still active in the different armed groups. Consequently, the real 
effect of drugs on violent behavior might be underestimated by our calculated models. 
Additionally, there is the question concerning the generalizability of our results. Future research 
should indicate whether the linkage between substance use and perpetrated violence is also 
present when interviewing combatants in different conflict settings. Notwithstanding, this study 
is the first attempt to examine the drugs-conflict nexus on a micro-level.  
 It is also important to note that we do not consider the use of alcohol or other drugs as a 
cause of violence. However, the analyses show that substance use boosts the likelihood of 
violence in the context of armed conflict. Both alcohol as well as drugs, such as marijuana, impair 
judgment and reason and reduce inhibitions. This is also confirmed by many combatants 
themselves that indicate that they often are intoxicated before going to battle. Hence, the 
widespread use of alcohol and drugs, while not the sole explanation, surely contributes to the 
high level of committed violence. We also think it is important that after the war, international 
and non-governmental organisations should address the impact of drugs on the former 
combatant adequately. Demobilization programs should be set up, which include assistance for 
alcohol and drug addiction for these soldiers. Only then we can decrease the likelihood of re-
outbreak of violence.  
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Min Max Obs.  
Perpetrated violence 3.87 1.84 0 7 217 
Alcohol use 0.53 0.50 0 1 223 
Alcohol functioning 0.18 0.39 0 1 222 
Drug use 0.17 0.38 0 1 223 
Drug functioning 0.82 0.39 0 1 94 
Recruitment 0.49 0.50 0 1 220 
Age joined 16.83 5.89 0 37 224 
Duration 6.54 5.26 0.04 28 224 
No. of armed groups 1.52 0.79 1 5 224 
Military rank  2.84 1.82 1 8 212 
FDLR 0.52 0.59 0 2 224 
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Table 2. Alcohol usage and perpetrated violence 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Full 
Constant 4.781*** 
(0.419) 
4.929*** 
(0.413) 
4.674*** 
(0.421) 
4.807*** 
(0.415) 
5.147*** 
(0.388) 
Alcohol use 0.653*** 
(0.218) 
 0.629*** 
(0.217) 
  
Alcohol functioning  0.735*** 
(0.276) 
 0.716*** 
(0.275) 
0.730*** 
(0.277) 
Age joined -0.103*** 
(0.019) 
-0.102*** 
(0.019) 
-0.106*** 
(0.019) 
-0.106*** 
(0.019) 
-0.103*** 
(0.019) 
Duration -0.050** 
(0.022) 
-0.050** 
(0.022) 
-0.070*** 
(0.024) 
-0.071*** 
(0.024) 
-0.043** 
(0.021) 
No. of armed groups 0.204 
(0.143) 
0.219 
(0.144) 
0.169 
(0.144) 
0.180 
(0.144) 
 
Military rank  0.132*** 
(0.065) 
0.157** 
(0.065) 
0.177** 
(0.069) 
0.205*** 
(0.069) 
0.182*** 
(0.063) 
Recruitment 0.575** 
(0.228) 
0.529** 
(0.228) 
0.644*** 
(0.230) 
0.604*** 
(0.230) 
0.558** 
(0.228) 
FDLR   0.381* 
(0.216) 
0.409* 
(0.217) 
 
N 205 204 205 204 204 
Adjusted R2 0.1913 0.1817 0.1999 0.1922 0.1762 
Note: Reported are the standardized beta coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses; 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3. Drug usage and perpetrated violence 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Full 
Constant 4.832*** 
(0.417) 
5.164*** 
(0.820) 
4.723*** 
(0.419) 
4.968*** 
(0.797) 
5.061*** 
(0.393) 
Drug use 0.796*** 
(0.281) 
 0.765*** 
(0.280) 
 0.787*** 
(0.282) 
Drug functioning  -0.388 
(0.442) 
 -0.615 
(0.437) 
 
Age joined -0.097*** 
(0.019) 
-0.069** 
(0.033) 
-0.100*** 
(0.019) 
-0.077** 
(0.033) 
-0.097*** 
(0.019) 
Duration -0.052** 
(0.022) 
0.011 
(0.041) 
-0.071*** 
(0.024) 
-0.038 
(0.044) 
-0.045** 
(0.021) 
No. of armed groups 0.228 
(0.143) 
0.109 
(0.229) 
0.192 
(0.144) 
0.046 
(0.223) 
 
Military rank  0.147** 
(0.065) 
0.114 
(0.105) 
0.192*** 
(0.069) 
0.232** 
(0.111) 
0.173*** 
(0.063) 
Recruitment 0.548** 
(0.227) 
0.355 
(0.369) 
0.619*** 
(0.230) 
0.528 
(0.363) 
0.579** 
(0.227) 
FDLR   0.383* 
(0.216) 
.986** 
(0.383) 
 
N 205 91 205 91 205 
Adjusted R2 0.1876 0.0533 0.1962 0.1126 0.1813 
Note: Reported are the standardized beta coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses; 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figures 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The effect of drugs according to the former combatants 
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Figure 2: Dot plot of full model 
Note: presented are the standardized regression coefficients plotted against the 95% confidence 
interval 
 
 
